

The Home Price Outlook

Are We Experiencing a Housing "Bubble"?

May 5, 2005

Thomas A. Lawler SVP, Risk Policy Fannie Mae "A bubble may be defined loosely as a sharp rise in the price of an asset or a range of assets in a continuous process, with the initial rise generating expectations of further rises and attracting new buyers – generally speculators interested in profits from trading in the asset rather than its use or earnings capacity."


Charles Kindleberger*, The New Palgrave, A Dictionary of Economics

*Professor Emeritus at MIT, and author of "Manias, Panics, and Crashes"

Have the Potential Indicators of a Housing Bubble Intensified?


 National home price growth reached an all-time high versus both inflation and income growth in 2004, and 25 out of 100 of the top MSAs had home price appreciation of 20% or more last year – the highest percentage since 1979, when CPI inflation was 13%.

Nominal and Real Home Prices




Home Prices versus Disposable Personal Income Per Capita

rolling two-year annualized growth rate



Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight


Home Price Appreciation in the Census Divisions



Source: OFHEO


Distribution of 4Q Rollover Growth Rates: 1980Q1-2004Q4 for Top 100 MSAs*

25% of MSAs > 20%!




Source: Fannie Mae Purchase Home Price Index; December 2004 data

Median Home Price/Median Household Income, U.S. and Selected Cities



Source: National Association of Realtors, Economy.com estimates

Affordability Indices, U.S. and Selected Cities




Index = 100 when median household income qualifies for an 80-percent mortgage on a median existing homes. Rising index indicates more buyers can enter the market. 9

Source: Economy.com estimates

Have the Potential Indicators of a Housing Bubble Intensified?

•The investor share of the purchase market has increased dramatically, to levels not seen since at least the late 1980's. The investor share increase has been concentrated in MSAs with exceptionally rapid home price growth.


Investor Share for Prime Conventional Conforming Purchase Loans



Source: LoanPerformance

Home Price Growth and the Investor Share of Purchase Loans by MSA

(Yr/Yr Home Price Growth and Investor Share in Q4:2004, by Number of Loans)




Source: OFHEO Home Price Index, LoanPerformance Prime Conventional Datrabase as of Dec 2004


Investor Shares For Prime Conventional Conforming Purchase Loans In Selected MSAs (Five National/MSA Options)

Source: LoanPerformance (Includes Fanne Mae), data are # of loans as of Dec 2004.

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


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
Source: LoanPerformance (Includes Fanne Mae), data are # of loans as of Dec 2004.

Investor Shares For Prime Conventional Conforming Purchase Loans In Selected MSAs (Five National/MSA Options)



Source: LoanPerformance (Includes Fanne Mae), data are # of loans as of Dec 2004.

Investor Share of Purchase Loan Market vs. Home Price Growth: California




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
Have the Potential Indicators of a Housing Bubble Intensified?

- •New and existing home sales jumped well above what household growth would have suggested last year—recent surveys suggest that some households accelerated purchase decisions based either on projected home price gains or on concerns about rising interest rates.
- •Census data suggest that there has been a sharp increase in the single-family rental vacancy rate.

New Homes For Sale




Source: Census Bureau



Source: Census Bureau 17

Rental Vacancy Rate




Source: Census Bureau 18

Have the Potential Indicators of a Housing Bubble Intensified?

- •The ARM share of the market has been much higher than interest rates and spreads would have suggested, and ARM products designed to minimize initial payments (e.g., I-O, neg-am) have gone from "niche" to mainstream.
- •The low/no doc share of the purchase market has risen considerably.
- •Use of subordinate financing even for jumbo loans has increased sharply, producing a rise in CLTVs.

Actual and Projected ARM Share of the Number of Conventional Loans Closed for Purchase



Sources: Federal Housing Finance Board, Fannie Mae

Characteristics of Purchase Originations by Market Segment

	2003							
	Low & No		2nd		Ю	Simultaneous		
	ARM	Doc	Investor	Home	ARMs	2nds		
	(Share of \$Volume)							
Government	6.2%	-	-	-	-	-		
PCC	18.2%	16.7%	6.5%	5.1%	-	-		
Prime Jumbo	63.8%	30.5%	1.8%	7.4%	36.1%	10.3%		
Subprime	80.6%	42.8%	7.2%	1.3%	9.1%	18.4%		
Alt-A	44.0%	65.0%	18.1%	3.9%	25.1%	20.6%		

	2004							
		Low & No		2nd	Ю	Simultaneous		
	ARM	Doc	Investor	Home	ARMs	2nds		
	(Share of \$Volume)							
Government	21.2%	-	-	-	-	-		
PCC	36.1%	22.3%	8.1%	6.5%	-	-		
Prime Jumbo	81.5%	42.4%	3.1%	9.0%	52.5%	21.0%		
Subprime	87.7%	44.8%	7.7%	1.5%	23.5%	30.2%		
Alt-A	72.1%	63.4%	18.2%	4.7%	50.9%	39.7%		

Sources:

Government - GNMA


PCC - Federal Housing Finance Board, LoanPerformance

Prime Jumbo, Subprime, & Alt-A - LoanPerformance


Have the Potential Indicators of a Housing Bubble Intensified?

- •Private-label securities issuance has soared, with increasingly "risky" loans backing the securities.
- •The subprime share of the purchase market has jumped, mainly at the expense of the government share.
- •The subprime market is mainly two-year, high-margin adjustable-rate loans.

Distribution of MBS Issuance by Issuer



Distribution of Private Label MBS Issuance by Type




Source: Inside MBS & ABS

Characteristics of Purchase Loans Backing Private Label MBS

		Interest Only	Non-Owner	Full	Share w/				
	ARM	ARM	Occupied	Doc	Simultaneous	Average	Average		
	Share	Share	Share	Share	Seconds	CLTV	FICO		
Subprime MBS									
2001	73.6%	0.0%	7.9%	70.4%	7.1%	85.1%	605		
2002	79.5%	1.8%	8.1%	60.9%	6.1%	85.5%	631		
2003	79.2%	8.2%	8.6%	57.6%	19.5%	89.7%	651		
2004	87.7%	23.5%	9.2%	55.1%	30.2%	91.2%	652		
Alt-A MBS									
2001	18.0%	3.0%	12.6%	34.4%	1.7%	84.2%	699		
2002	26.7%	6.5%	16.8%	36.2%	2.6%	83.9%	708		
2003	39.3%	22.5%	21.5%	34.2%	20.0%	85.4%	717		
2004	72.1%	50.9%	22.9%	33.8%	39.7%	86.4%	717		
Jumbo MBS									
2001	25.3%	5.4%	5.3%	72.7%	0.7%	75.9%	724		
2002	44.0%	19.7%	6.7%	67.8%	1.7%	75.0%	733		
2003	61.7%	34.8%	9.1%	52.4%	13.3%	76.8%	738		
2004	81.5%	52.5%	12.1%	49.2%	21.0%	78.4%	738		


Source: 2001 to 2003 - UBS Warburg; 2004 - LoanPerformance

Market Segment Share of Total Purchase Market




Government Share of Purchase Originations

By Borrower Race/Ethnicity



Subprime Share of Purchase Originations

By Borrower Race/Ethnicity



Characteristics of Loans Backing Private Label Subprime MBS


		Average				Share w/	Interest	Average	
	Product	Note	Average	Average	Purchase	Prepayment	Only	DTI	Full Doc
	Share	Rate	FICO	CLTV	Share	Penalty	Share	Ratio	Share
	2004								
FRM	26%	7.18%	648	79%	22%	77%	1%	39%	68%
ARM	74%	7.14%	619	85%	39%	75%	14%	40%	60%
2-Year	57%		Average ARM Margin Over Libor: 604						
3-Year	15%		Average First Reset Cap:			232 bps			
5-Year	1%		Average Lifetime Cap: 639			639 bps			
	2003								
FRM	35%	7.52%	646	80%	20%	73%	0%	39%	66%
ARM	65%	7.71%	610	83%	34%	79%	3%	40%	65%
2-Year	53%		Average ARM Margin Over Libor:			623 bps			
3-Year	10%		Average First Reset Cap:			231 bps			
5-Year	1%		Average Lifetime Cap:			633 bps			

Source: Lehman Brothers


Distribution of Subprime MBS Purchase Loans and PCC Purchase Loans by Loan Type in 2004

Subprime Purchase Loans

PCC Purchase Loans



Shares of Loans with Rate Reset in the Next 10 Years



There Is No Clear Consensus View

No Bubble

- Demographics strong/potential minority demand high
- Inventory/sales ratios relatively low
- Supply a constraint
- Unemployment falling
- Economic expansion continuing
- Interest rates low
- Second home/investor demand from aging baby boomers
- Credit market pricing suggests benign housing credit outlook

Bubble Concerns

- Net housing production exceeding household growth
- Vacancy rates/inventories rising
- Speculative buying increasing
- Interest rates rising
- Underwriting loosening
- Affordability concerns breeding "creative" (risky) financing
- ARM share high despite lower fixed-rate yields/flatter curve
- MI industry/equity investors expressing concerns about 32 market trends

A Number of the Lending Patterns Observed Over the Last Year Were Also Seen in the late 1980's – The ""Boom" of the Last "Boom/Bust"

- Increased investor buying/speculative behavior
- Unrealistically high consumer expectations for home price appreciation
- Creative, riskier financing to surmount affordability concerns
- Much higher ARM share than models were projecting
- Dramatic rise in low/no doc lending

Washington Post Articles from the Past:

- "With mortgage rates and home prices rising, attractive and affordable mortgages are becoming hard to come by... Accordingly, lenders and mortgage brokers are wheeling out "creative financing" alternatives that could make it easier to qualify for loans and get lower initial payments." (4/1/89)
 - Products mentioned: graduated payment, neg am, interest-only, 40-year loans.
- "Limited (low documentation and no-documentation) mortgage applications have been one
 of the most popular consumer innovations of the past three years....some experts estimate
 that 30 percent to 40 percent of all conventional home loans made in 1988 and 1989 used
 some version of the limited documentation concept. " (10/20/90)
 - (Article highlighted by Fannie Mae tightening its requirements on no doc and low doc loans).
- "A novel mortgage plan introduced this month...illustrates the extremes that aggressive lenders are exploring. It's called the 'LEAP'... " (4/9/88)
 - Features: teaser rate; interest-only: underlying 6-month ARM; 5-year balloon; "easy documentation" with 20 percent down at settlement

Summary Conclusions

- No one can say that a "bubble" exists until after the fact
- However, conditions in many parts of the country (though certainly not most of the country) mirror past conditions that preceded regional housing "busts"
- The probability of such an event occurring has risen sharply in certain parts of the country
- The housing market's sensitivity both to interest rates and employment growth has increased